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ROGUE COMMITTEES OR ROGUE JUDGES: THE LIMITS OF
A BANKRUPTCY JUDGE’S AUTHORITY TO DISBAND
CHAPTER 11 COMMITTEES
ABSTRACT
When confronted with a misbehaving chapter 11 committee, bankruptcy
courts have a limited list of remedies available to preserve equity. Universally,
courts may address committee misbehavior through the disallowance of the
committee’s attorneys’ fees, or through a modification of the committee’s
membership. The collective acceptance of these remedies was the result of the
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) of 2005.
However, when these lesser remedies fail, the question of court authority
becomes much more divisive. Recently, a split has emerged amongst the courts
as to whether bankruptcy judges have the authority to use the “judicial hammer”
of disbanding a misbehaving committee.
This Comment argues that when a committee is engaged in severe
misfeasance or malfeasance, bankruptcy judges must have the power to disband
the committee. If a court determines that a less severe equitable remedy is
insufficient to correct the misbehavior, only then should the bankruptcy judge
proceed to disbanding the committee. Employing this Comment’s three-factor
test, bankruptcy courts can assure that this last resort remedy remains the
exception, not the rule.
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INTRODUCTION
Bankruptcy courts are split on judicial authority to disband chapter 11
committees under the 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act (“BAPCPA”).1 The issue, although litigated rarely, constitutes a
fundamental dispute over the actual authority of judges to control the conduct of
litigious parties. In this debate some courts take the position that judges may
eliminate committees,2 while others ardently argue that Congress has delegated
no such authority.3 Yet, the dominant position taken by courts that have
mentioned the split is to take no side and to decide their specific cases on other
grounds.4 As a result, the question of judicial committee disbandment has proven
divisive enough to generate a circuit split, important enough to implicate a
judge’s authority, and daunting enough to force a slew of courts to punt on the
issue.
This Comment argues that bankruptcy judges must have the authority to
disband rogue committees for misfeasance or malfeasance. The reasons for this
are twofold. First, rogue creditor committee misfeasance and malfeasance can
unjustifiably harm the debtor-in-possession and the committee’s constituent
creditors. When a committee breaches its fiduciary duties, it creates an
opportunity for the financial abuse of the debtor-in-possession and negatively
impacts the return to creditors. Second, the court’s 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) equitable
powers should extend to disbanding a committee to allow the court to resolve
inequities caused by rogue committees. This is evidenced by analogous
exercises of § 105(a) court authority and parallels other court issued equitable
remedies for party misbehavior. This Comment concludes by offering a threestep factor test to aid bankruptcy judges in determining when a committee ought
to be disbanded.

1
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23
(2005); In re City of Detroit, Mich., 519 B.R. 673, 680 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014); In re Pac. Ave., LLC, 467
B.R. 868, 870 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2012); In re Dow Corning Corp., 194 B.R. 121, 131 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1996),
rev’d, 212 B.R. 258 (E.D. Mich. 1997); In re Caesars Entm’t Operating Co., Inc., 526 B.R. 265 (Bankr. N.D.
Ill. 2015); In re New Life Fellowship, Inc., 202 B.R. 994, 997 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1996); In re JNL Funding
Corp., 438 B.R. 356, 361 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Dewey & Leboeuf LLP, No. 12-12321 MG, 2012 WL
5985325, at *5 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2012); In re Hearthstone Homes, Inc., No. BK12-80348-TLS, 2012
WL 4027296, at *3 (Bankr. D. Neb. Sept. 12, 2012).
2
In re City of Detroit, Mich., 519 B.R. at 680; In re Pac. Ave., LLC, 467 B.R. at 870; In re Dow Corning
Corp., 194 B.R. at 131.
3
In re Caesars Entm’t Operating Co., Inc., 526 B.R. 265; In re New Life Fellowship, Inc., 202 B.R. at
997.
4
In re JNL Funding Corp., 438 B.R. at 361; In re Dewey & Leboeuf LLP, 2012 WL 5985325, at *5; In
re Hearthstone Homes, Inc., 2012 WL 4027296, at *3.
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This Comment begins with a discussion of the history of chapter 11 creditor
committees. Such a discussion highlights the goals of Congress in creating
creditor committees and demonstrates Congress’s thought process in balancing
the equities between the debtor-in-possession and the creditors. Then the
Comment defines a committee’s duties and discusses what effect an abdication
of those duties can have on the debtor and on the committee’s co-creditors. Next,
the Comment briefly describes the old circuit split regarding a judge’s authority
to modify a committee prior to the passage of BAPCPA which settled that debate
in 2005. This is followed by a discussion of the current circuit split concerning
the disbandment of a committee. The Comment then clarifies the debate,
presents real world examples of rogue committee abuses, offers analogous areas
of court authority, and answers the procedural question implicated by judicial
disbandment. Finally, the Comment proposes a factor test to resolve the circuit
split and provide guidance to the courts moving forward.
I.

BACKGROUND

Before deciding the question of a bankruptcy judge’s authority to disband a
committee, it is necessary to understand the context surrounding the existence
of committees and the responsibilities they have been assigned by Congress and
the courts. This Section (1) describes the historical origins of chapter 11
committees, (2) discusses the legislative history surrounding modern
committees, and (3) precisely defines the duties assigned to chapter 11
committees. This background reveals why Congress allowed committees to
emerge, and contextualizes the misbehavior of committees that courts have
disbanded.
A. Origins of Chapter 11 Committees
In a typical bankruptcy proceeding there are three represented parties. These
parties are the debtor, the creditors, and the U.S. Trustee.5 Each of these parties
play a unique and independently essential role in a bankruptcy proceeding.
Typically, creditors solely bear the responsibility of advocating for their own
financial interest.6 In doing so, creditors’ duties are wide ranging, including
objecting to property being classified as exempt from the estate.7 On the other
5
See Bankruptcy Basics, BANKRUPTCY JUDGES DIVISION ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS 6 (3d. ed. Nov. 2011), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/bankbasics-post10172005.
pdf.
6
See DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY: DEALING WITH FINANCIAL FAILURE FOR INDIVIDUALS
AND BUSINESSES 28 (4th ed. 2015).
7
In re Banke, 267 B.R. 852, 854 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2001).
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hand, debtors must cooperate with the U.S. Trustee as is necessary for the trustee
to perform his or her statutory duties.8
These “typical” bankruptcy proceedings are either chapter 7 or chapter 13
filings. In 2016, of the 833,407 total bankruptcy filings, 825,587 were either
chapter 7 or chapter 13 filings.9 As such, 99.06 percent of bankruptcy petitions
filed in 2016 were under chapter 7 or chapter 13. In these cases, the creditors,
debtor, and U.S. Trustee each play their usual roles and have their normal
responsibilities.
Statistically, chapter 11 filings are rare, accounting for only 0.88 percent of
all bankruptcy filings.10 Importantly, in a chapter 11 case, the interested parties
to the litigation are different, and their roles are unique, from that of the typical
bankruptcy. These parties to a chapter 11 proceeding are the debtor-inpossession and the creditor committees.11 Unlike in a chapter 7, a chapter 11
debtor remains in possession of his/her/its property. The debtor-in-possession
steps into the shoes of the trustee by administering the property of the estate.12
While there are still creditors in a chapter 11, these creditors uniquely have the
opportunity to form committees.13
Creditor committees are created by the U.S. Trustee and normally consist of
seven of the debtor’s largest creditors.14 The responsibilities of the creditor
committee are varied, but generally require acting in the interests of the
constituent creditors represented by the committee.15 To fulfill these duties,
creditor committees may hire attorneys, accountants, or any other agents who
would aid the committee in performing these aforementioned duties.16
Importantly, the cost of hiring these professionals is considered an

8

In re Marve, 43 F. App’x 943, 945 (6th Cir. 2002).
March 2017 Bankruptcy Filings Down 4.7 Percent, UNITED STATES COURTS (Published April 19,
2017) http://www.uscourts.gov/news/2017/04/19/march-2017-bankruptcy-filings-down-47-percent.
10
See id. Accounting for the year of 2017 only. This number is a decrease from the amount of chapter
11’s filed in 2016.
11
See 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b).
12
Id. § 1107 (Rights, powers, and duties of debtor in possession).
13
Id. § 1102(a)(1).
14
Id. § 1102.
15
Id. § 1103(c) (These duties generally include consulting with the debtor-in-possession, investigating
the acts, conduct, financial liability, and operations of the debtor and his or her business, participating in the
formulation of a plan, collecting creditor acceptances or rejections of a plan, in rare instances requesting the
appointment of a chapter 11 trustee).
16
Id. § 1103(a).
9
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“Administrative Expense” and, to the extent allowed, must be paid in full by the
debtor-in-possession prior to confirmation of the plan.17
Creditor committees began to see regular use in 1934 after Congress passed
§ 77B of the Bankruptcy Act. This allowed a two-thirds majority consensus of
each creditor class to force the adoption of a repayment plan that scaled down
the debtor’s obligations.18 This provision created a wave of gamesmanship
between creditors that precipitated the advent of “insider” committees of
creditors.19 These “insider” committees worked with debtors to create coalitions
of creditors that could force “insider favorable” plans through to confirmation.20
In response to these “insider” committees, “protective” committees formed to
negotiate with, and act as a check on, the “insider” committees.21
This remained the case until the Chandler Act of 1938. The Chandler Act
created chapter X and chapter XI as two separate forms of business
reorganization.22 Chapter X was intended for large businesses and, in response
to the gamesmanship of § 77B, eliminated “insider” creditor control by the
appointment of a disinterested trustee.23 Chapter XI, on the other hand, was
intended for small businesses, allowed for the debtor to remain in possession,
and provided for the creditors to jointly elect a committee to represent their
interests.24
The creation of protective committees for non-insider unsecured creditors
was a necessary maneuver due to the realities of bankruptcy disbursements.
According to the Administrative Agency of U.S. Courts, between 1965 and 1968
creditors received sixteen percent of the total amount of claims on debtor assets
in liquidation bankruptcies.25 Of this, secured creditors received sixty-six cents
on the dollar despite accounting for only eleven percent of allowed claims.26
Priority unsecured creditors, accounting for only nine percent of claims,

17

In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., 508 B.R. 283, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
See 73 P.L. 296, 48 Stat. 911, 73 Cong. Ch. 424 § 77B (1934).
19
Daniel J. Bussel, Coalition-Building Through Bankruptcy Creditors’ Committees, 43 UCLA L. REV.
1547, 1556 (1996).
20
Id.
21
Id. at 1557.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id. at 1558.
25
BRUCE G. CARRUTHERS & TERENCE C. HALLIDAY, RESCUING BUSINESS 314 (Oxford University Press
1998). Between 1965 and 1968 the total monetary amount of claims on a debtor’s estate assets totaled on average
$431,000,000 per year. Of this total, only $70,000,000 were received by creditors.
26
Id.
18
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recovered thirty-five cents on the dollar.27 Yet, unsecured creditors, who
accounted for eighty percent of all claims on estate assets, received only seven
cents on the dollar.28
This dramatic discrepancy was not unique to liquidation bankruptcies, and
indeed was similarly present in corporate reformations. According to a
Brookings Institute report, in chapter XI reorganizations roughly sixty percent
of an average corporation’s debt was issued by unsecured creditors.29 Despite
this, secured creditors were paid eighty percent of the time and recovered thirtyone cents on the dollar.30 Priority creditors recovered thirty-six percent of their
claims, yet non-priority unsecured creditors only managed to get forty-four
percent of their claims categorized as allowed claims.31 Of these, unsecured
creditors only received a meager eight cents on the dollar.32 Given these historic
realities, it is not surprising that committees emerged as a means of protecting
creditor interests.
Additionally, while the Chandler Act created official creditor committees, it
offered little respite from the expenses associated with committee operation. As
Justice Douglas noted in Dickinson Indus. Site v. Cowan,33 the Chandler Act
allowed for the compensation of committee members, but made similar
compensation difficult for committee professionals.34 Under the Chandler Act,
if a professional wanted compensation he or she would receive it only at the rate
that the “economy of administration” required.35 The “economy of
administration” standard dictated that professionals could only be paid if
creditors were first paid in full, which had the effect of forcing bankruptcy
attorney rates to be below what they could earn in a different practice area.36
This restriction created an incentive for qualified professionals to avoid
representing creditor committees.

27

Id.
Id.
29
Id.
30
CARRUTHERS & HALLIDAY, supra note 25 at 314.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
309 U.S. 382 (1940).
34
Dickinson Indus. Site v. Cowan, 309 U.S. 382, 388–89 (1940) (quoting Chandler Act. Sec. 249, 11
U.S.C. § 649).
35
Albert Togut & Lauren L. Peacock, The Growth of Modern Practice Evolution of Bankruptcy Practice
Before the Code to Today, 35 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 24 (Oct. 2016).
36
Id.
28
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B. Legislative History of the Modern Bankruptcy Code
The bifurcated chapter X and chapter XI approach to business reorganization
endured until Congress decided to more broadly balance the equities of
corporate bankruptcies in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. The Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978 melded together chapter X and chapter XI into chapter 11.37
The legislative history of the Bankruptcy Reform Act demonstrated a knowledge
of the bifurcated past of business reorganization, and noticeably used language
indicating a preference for the approach taken in chapter XI.38 Reflecting this
preference, Congress created chapter 11 to permit debtors to remain in
possession of their assets.39 Congress also adopted, and expanded on, the idea of
committee involvement in chapter XI by expressly permitting multiple
committees in chapter 11 filings.40 Moreover, Congress chose to more generally
describe a committee’s role in the administration of a case, stating:
The supervisory functions of the committees will be diminished, due
to the existence of the United States Trustee. They will primarily be
negotiating bodies for the classes of creditors that they represent. As
such, it is important that they be representative of their respective
classes, and not chosen by attorneys for creditors that seek the position
of counsel to the committee.41

Thus, in 1978 Congress took the initiative to loosely define the intended role of
the creditor committee in chapter 11 filings.
In 1978 the House version of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, H.R. 8200, was
introduced to the House of Representatives.42 H.R. 8200 empowered the court
to appoint one or more committees to represent unsecured creditors in business
reorganizations.43 It also switched attorney compensation from the old
“economy of administration” standard to a “cost of comparable services”
standard.44 H.R. 8200 received a warm reception and was passed by the House.45
The Senate’s version was S. 2266, and reflected the Senate’s choice to
protect creditors in a different way than H.R. 8200 proposed. Notably, unlike the
37

Bussel, supra note 19 at 1559.
H.R. Rep. 95-595, 91, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6052.
39
H.R. Rep. 95-595, 104, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6065.
40
H.R. Rep. 95-595, 104, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6065.
41
H.R. Rep. 95-595, 104, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6065.
42
CARRUTHERS & HALLIDAY, supra note 25 at 324.
43
Id.
44
Matter of Hamilton Hardware Co., Inc., 11 B.R. 326, 328 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1981), aff’d sub nom. In
re Hamilton Hardware Co., Inc., 8 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 667 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 11, 1981).
45
CARRUTHERS & HALLIDAY, supra note 25 at 325.
38
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House bill, the Senate bill sought to maintain the Chandler Act’s “economy of
administration” standard of attorney compensation.46 On July 14, 1978, S. 2266
was reported out of the Senate Judiciary committee, and a modified version of
the bill was later enacted as the final Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.47
One of the important modifications to the Senate bill was the adoption of
H.R. 8200’s switch from compensating creditor committee attorneys at the
“economy of administration” to compensation at the “cost of comparable
services.”48 This meant that for the first time, bankruptcy attorneys could be paid
at 100 percent the cost of their rate; making such a practice comparable in
profitability to corporate work.49 This aspect of the Bankruptcy Reform Act
therefore served to attract qualified professionals to committee representation.
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 also produced the first version of the
modern Bankruptcy Code,50 and the Code concretely established the right of
creditors to committee representation.51 Section 503 of the Bankruptcy Code
created specified allowances for certain costs to be classified as “Administrative
Expenses.”52 One of those costs that the debtor was mandated to pay was the
“actual, necessary services” rendered by professionals employed to represent a
party in a bankruptcy proceeding.53 The purpose of this was to eliminate the
arbitrary limit on the fees that the committee’s attorney could demand.54 After
1978, not only were committee attorneys being paid at competitive rates, but
additionally, the debtor was wholly responsible for footing the bill.
Consequently, Congress ended the debate over how creditors could be
represented in a corporate reformation, but left open the discussion over how
courts ought to police committees once they are formed.
C. Defining a Committee’s Duties
Discussing the appropriate remedial measures for committee misfeasance
and malfeasance requires an understanding of what a committee’s duties are in
a chapter 11 case. Committees have express duties to their creditor constituency
46
Matter of Hamilton Hardware Co., Inc., 11 B.R. 326, 328 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1981) (“The Senate did
not intend to change existing law.”).
47
CARRUTHERS & HALLIDAY, supra note 25 at 327.
48
Togut & Peacock, supra note 35.
49
Id.
50
Charles J. Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV.
5, 32 (1995).
51
11 U.S.C. § 1102.
52
Id. § 503.
53
Id. § 330(a)(1).
54
Matter of Hamilton Hardware Co., Inc., 11 B.R. 326, 329 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1981).
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and implied duties to the debtor. The committee’s duties to their co-creditors
arise from their judicially established fiduciary duties and out of § 1103 of the
Bankruptcy Code; the committee’s implicit duties to the debtor arise out of Rule
9011(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. These duties help to
contextualize what is meant by committee misfeasance and malfeasance.
The fiduciary duty a committee has to its constituent creditors is fundamental
and defined by undivided loyalty and impartial service to all creditors
represented.55 The committee’s fiduciary duties differ from that of the corporate
fiduciary, because the committee is bound not only to serving its co-creditors,
but also to safeguarding the bankruptcy process.56 This stems from the fact that
membership on a committee is not intended to grant financial advantages to any
one creditor over his or her co-creditors.57 Importantly, a breach of a
committee’s fiduciary duty can even extend to the committee’s mishandling of
non-estate property.58
Additionally, § 1103 of the Bankruptcy Code imposes a statutory duty upon
committees to protect the interests of their co-creditors.59 Despite its use of the
permissive “may,” § 1103 has been read to establish a non-exhaustive list of
duties a committee is bound to with respect to its co-creditors.60 Because of this,
§ 1103 establishes that a committee has a duty to act as a “watchdog” for the
interests of its co-creditors.61 If a § 1103 power is needed to protect the creditors’
interests, the committee must exercise that power.62 This means that if a
committee’s actions harm the interests of co-creditors, the committee has
abdicated its duty and has committed an act of either misfeasance or
malfeasance.
Conversely, while a committee bears no express duties to the debtor,63 a
committee does have duties with respect to the Court.64 Rule 9011(b)(1) states,
in pertinent part:
By presenting to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or
later advocating) a petition, pleading, written motion, or other paper,
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64

In re Fas Mart Convenience Stores, Inc., 265 B.R. 427, 432 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2001).
Westmoreland Human Opportunities, Inc. v. Walsh, 327 B.R. 561, 573 (W.D. Pa. 2005).
Id.
Id. at 570.
See 11 U.S.C. § 1103.
Matter of Advisory Comm. of Major Funding Corp., 109 F.3d 219, 224 (5th Cir. 1997).
Id.
Id.
In re Seaescape Cruises, Ltd., 131 B.R. 241, 243 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1991).
In re Mesta Mach. Co., 67 B.R. 151, 158 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1986).
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an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that . . . it is not being
presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.65

Because committees are directly funded by the debtor, their malicious stalling
may needlessly increase the costs of litigation.66 In view of this, committees
possess an implicit duty to not waste the debtor’s resources. Put another way,
committees have an obligation to the court to not abuse the bankruptcy process
in any way that would unjustly prejudice the debtor. Notably, the express
authority of the bankruptcy court to sanction a party for violating its Rule 9011
duties does not establish the outer bounds of judicial remedies available to
judges in addressing the abdication of those duties.67 Thus, once a duty has been
established, the court may use its broad equitable powers to punish a party’s
abdication of said duty.68 Here, this means that the court has broad equitable
authority to correct committee misbehavior with respect to the debtor.
When a committee has breached either its duties to constituent creditors or
to the debtor, that committee is “rogue”. A rogue committee is defined by the
misfeasance and malfeasance that the committee may engage in. A rogue
committee’s abandonment of its duties can be grave, and unjustifiably harm the
interests of the debtor and co-creditors.
II. HARMS CAUSED BY ROGUE COMMITTEES
The issue of committee misfeasance or malfeasance is not a legal question
without practical significance. On the contrary, committee misbehavior can
severely damage the interests of all parties to the bankruptcy, and can cause
sizeable inequities. In this Section, the Comment first discusses the harms rogue
committees can do to the debtor. Second, this Section discusses the damage
rogue committees can do to the creditors. The purpose of this Section is to
illustrate the severity of rogue committee misfeasance or malfeasance, and to
provide context for litigants’ motions for judicial committee disbandment.

65

FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011(b)(1) (emphasis added).
See 11 U.S.C. § 330 (a)(1).
67
See Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 324 (2d Cir. 1980) (J. Mansfield, Dissenting), aff’d sub nom. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982) (“Congress is not under any duty to state
that the various remedies provided by it are exclusive, much less to disavow or disassociate itself from prior
lower court decisions as if they were statutes enacted by it.”).
68
In re Xpedior Inc., 354 B.R. 210, 238 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2006) (“[T]he equitable tools found under 11
U.S.C. § 105(a) can be exercised to carry out bankruptcy duties and jurisdiction.”).
66
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A. How Rogue Committees Harm the Debtor
Rogue creditor committees can unjustifiably harm debtors by weaponizing
their professional’s fees as administrative expenses. The term “Administrative
Expenses” is not defined in § 503 of the Bankruptcy Code; however, an
“Administrative Expense” is commonly understood to refer to such expenses
that are (1) generated after the start of the bankruptcy case, and (2) incurred in
an effort to benefit the estate.69 Those expenses which are categorized as
“Administrative Expenses” are given second priority under § 507(a), and as such
must be paid in full on the effective date of the plan.70
In chapter 11 proceedings, creditor committees are permitted to hire
professionals to represent the committee and advance the creditors’ interests.71
Section 330(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code provides for reasonable compensation
for the services of professionals employed to represent a party in a bankruptcy
proceeding.72 These fees and expenses of professionals are considered
“Administrative Expenses” under § 503 of the Bankruptcy Code.73 As such, all
of the expenses the creditor committee incurs, as well as all the fees and expenses
charged by the committee’s professionals, are paid with money from the chapter
11 debtor’s estate.74
The professionals that serve a committee answer, and report exclusively, to
the committee itself.75 Attorneys representing a committee and the creditor
committee operate under attorney-client privilege.76 This privilege bars the U.S.
Trustee and the court from directing or otherwise involving themselves with the
committee’s attorney.77 To the extent that the court may police committee
professionals, it is largely via the court’s authority to determine the
reasonableness of committee professional fees.78 Yet, even this limited power is
reduced in effect by § 330, which only requires that attorney’s fees reflect

69

In re Midway Airlines Corp., 406 F.3d 229, 237 (4th Cir. 2005).
In re Sanders, 341 B.R. 47, 50 (Bankr. N.D. Ala.), aff’d, 347 B.R. 776 (N.D. Ala. 2006); 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129(a)(9)(A).
71
Matter of UNR Indus., Inc., 736 F.2d 1136, 1139 (7th Cir. 1984); see also Matter of Advisory Comm.
of Major Funding Corp., 109 F.3d 219, 224 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting In re AKF Foods, Inc., 36 B.R. 288, 289
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1984)); 11 U.S.C. § 1103(a).
72
11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1).
73
First Merchants Acceptance Corp. v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 198 F.3d 394, 398 (3d Cir. 1999).
74
Listecki v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors, 780 F.3d 731, 739 (7th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 136
S. Ct. 581, 193 L. Ed. 2d 464 (2015).
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
In re Tribeca Mkt., LLC, 516 B.R. 254, 270 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
70
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decisions made by the attorney which were reasonable at the time, expressly
rejecting an “actual benefit” test.79 What’s more, using the “loadstar method,”
many courts have adopted a “strong presumption” that an attorney’s fee is
reasonable insofar as it is calculated by merely multiplying the hours reasonably
worked by the attorney’s hourly rate.80
In retaining these professionals, committees often put a great financial strain
on a debtor-in-possession’s ability to create a viable plan of reorganization. On
average, bankruptcy attorneys account for almost half of the total cost of chapter
11 cases.81 Much of these costs arise because of the length of time that a chapter
11 case normally takes. Empirical studies show that the mean chapter 11 case
lasts for 437 days,82 with a shorter case typically lasting 136 days and a longer
case typically lasting 672 days.83 Empirical studies have indicated that debtors’
lead counsel alone can bill an average of 1,725.5 hours per case.84 In these cases,
the mean hourly rate charged by the debtor’s counsel was $290.54.85
Consequently, the average chapter 11 lead counsel alone billed their client
$501,326.77 per case, at an average cost of roughly $1,147.20 per day.86
The mean chapter 11 debtor has only $4,300,000 in total assets.87 Of these
assets, the median debtor in Boston and Atlanta entered bankruptcy with only
79
In re Woerner, 783 F.3d 266, 274 (5th Cir. 2015). The “actual benefit” test only permitted bankruptcy
attorneys to be compensated for the “actual, necessary services” rendered by the attorney and would force the
court to independently determine the actual value of the work done.
80
In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., Inc., 133 B.R. 13, 22 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991) (quoting
Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 564 (1986), supplemented, 483
U.S. 711 (1987)).
81
Stephen J. Lubben, The Chapter 11 Attorneys, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 447, 471 (2012).
82
Stephen P. Ferris & Robert M. Lawless, The Expenses of Financial Distress: The Direct Costs of
Chapter 11, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 629, 637 (2000).
83
Lynn M. LoPuckie & Joseph W. Doherty, Professional Overcharging in large Bankruptcy
Reorganization Cases, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 983, 1003 (2008). The lower limit for shorter cases and
higher limit for longer cases being determined by measuring one standard deviation from the mean case length.
84
Stephen J. Lubben, Corporate Reorganization & Professional Fees, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 77, 95 (2008)
[hereinafter Lubben, Corporate Reorganization]. This study also indicated that, within its sample of 1,026
chapter 11 cases filed in 2004, the average number of billable hours spent for “big cases” by the lead debtor’s
counsel increased to 5,026.7 hours per case.
85
Lubben, Corporate Reorganization, supra note 84 at 98.
86
These costs only account for the costs of the lead debtors counsel and are the product of a mathematical
calculation, multiplying the average number of hours billed and the average billing rate indicated in Lubben’s
2004 study. This number was divided by the mean number of days a chapter 11 case lasts to arrive at the
aforementioned average daily cost. As a special note, the mean number of days was taken from a separate study
conducted by Stephen Ferris. See Ferris & Lawless, supra note 82. It is also worth noting that this calculation
does not account for the $98,000 average monthly expense that “big cases” were authorized to pay for other
debtor professionals. See Lubben, Corporate Reorganization, supra note 84 at 96.
87
Ferris & Lawless, supra note 82, at 640 (Noting that the median chapter 11 debtor had even less, at
only $700,000 in total assets, thus suggesting a wide variation in the wealth of chapter 11 debtors.).
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one percent of their total assets classifiable as liquid.88 This money had to be
used, in part, to pay creditor committee professionals’ fees as well as the debtor’s
own professional expenses. According to a study of twelve chapter 11 cases
from 2000, the mean cost of a creditor committee’s professionals was
$393,689.61 over the life of the case.89 Moreover, professional fees and
expenses have risen at a rate of roughly 10.4 percent per year, outpacing
increases in consumer prices by fifty-seven percent.90 As such, it is unsurprising
that only seventeen percent of chapter 11 debtors can afford to make it to
confirmation.91
Cases with multiple creditor committees, however, are relatively rare. A
2004 study of 1,050 chapter 11 cases showed that creditor committees were used
in roughly sixty-seven percent of “big cases.”92 Of these, ten percent of “big
cases” utilized multiple creditor committees.93 Within all cases where a creditor
committee was used, seventy-eight percent of the committees elected to hire
professionals.94 As a result, increases in debtor size did not insulate debtors from
the effect of increased committee professional expenses.
Making the reasonable assumption that creditor committee attorney’s bill
similarly to their debtor counterparts, it is easy to see how a rogue committee
can weaponize their professionals. Doubling the daily cost of an attorney (to
account for there being one debtor’s counsel and one committee’s counsel)
would result in a total cost to the debtor of $2,294.40 per day. For the average
chapter 11 debtor this is manageable; however, if there is a third “rogue”
committee, retaining one attorney, the daily expenses increase to $3,441.60.
Using these averages, it would take 1,874 days to burn through all of the average
debtor’s assets with one committee, but only 1,249 days to do so with two
committees. While in most cases multiple committees are justified and necessary
to represent varied creditors, the extreme cost of committee representation
demands that judges take the risk of fee weaponization seriously.

88

Id. at 641.
Stephen J. Lubben, The Direct Costs of Corporate Reorganization: An Empirical Examination of
Professional Fees in Large Chapter 11 Cases, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 509, 530 (2000).
90
LoPuckie & Doherty, supra note 83, at 985.
91
Susan Jensen-Conklin, Financial Reporting by Chapter 11 Debtors: An Introduction to Statement of
Position 90-7, 66 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 35 (1992).
92
Lubben, Corporate Reorganization, supra note 84 at 94.
93
Id.
94
Lubben, Corporate Reorganization, supra note 84 at 97.
89
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B. How Rogue Committees Can Harm the Creditors
Rogue committees can harm debtors and the creditors which they purport to
protect. First, rogue committees, through resignations and removals, can harm
creditors by changing their membership such that they no longer adequately
represent creditors. Second, rogue committees can harm creditors by reducing
the value of the estate to their co-creditors.
1. Rogue Creditor Committees May Fail to Represent Creditors
Creditor committees may become unrepresentative of the creditor classes for
which they purport to advocate, thus necessitating committee disbandment.
While at their inception creditor committees may be appropriately
representative, as time goes on, they can become unrepresentative. This is often
due to creditor fatigue or due to certain creditors believing they can get a better
deal outside of bankruptcy. At times, these vacancies on committees cannot be
filled in such a way that will preserve the representative nature of the committee.
Where an unfillable vacancy exists, calling into question the adequacy of the
committee’s representation, justice requires that the judge have the discretion to
disband the broken committee.
One of the most obvious ways that a vacancy could emerge on a committee
is if a creditor resigns. Creditors are entitled, by statute, to resign from creditor
committees that they no longer wish to serve. Section 1102 specifically provides
that creditor committees will consist of “the persons, willing to serve . . . .”95
Courts have interpreted this language to mean that creditors cannot be forced to
serve, or remain, on a committee.96 As such, it is possible that a creditor may
resign from a committee, leaving no other creditors who are willing to fill the
void.
This situation may seem odd on its face; however, evidence indicates that
the longer a chapter 11 bankruptcy goes on, the more “creditor fatigue” sets in.97
“Creditor fatigue” means that the creditor has lost interest in the proceeding or
that the case has become too resource intensive for the creditor to continue to
play an active role.98 This creditor fatigue can result in cases in which no creditor

95

11 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(1) (emphasis added).
In re Schatz Fed. Bearings Co., Inc., 11 B.R. 363, 365 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981).
97
Peter C. Blain, The Increase in Prepackaged Chapter 11s: An Immediate Look at the Legal,
Governmental, and Economic Ramifications of the Resurgence of Prepackaged Bankruptcy Plans, 2008
ASPATORE SPECIAL REP. 7 (2008).
98
James M. Lloyd, UK/CLE DEBTOR/CREDITOR RELATIONS IN KENTUCKY § 3.33(c) (2011).
96
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is willing to fill a committee vacancy because, in short, the creditor has more
important things to do.99
Additionally, committee vacancies may be created by the U.S. Trustee
removing a creditor from a committee.100 One cause for such a removal may be
a determination by the U.S. Trustee that the creditor’s claim was no longer
properly representative of the classes he or she represented.101 Alternatively, the
U.S. Trustee may discover a creditor’s breach of his or her fiduciary duty, which
mandates removal of the creditor from the committee.102 In fact, courts have
previously held that the U.S. Trustee is required to remove a creditor from a
committee if there is merely the appearance of a breach of the committee
member’s fiduciary duties.103
When the class of creditors being represented is small, this may leave the
U.S. Trustee with no viable replacements.104 Whether it is caused by a
resignation or a removal, vacancies often emerge in creditor committees.
Evidence indicates that roughly one in four creditor committees will experience
either a creditor resignation or removal.105 In these situations, it is not enough
that there exists a creditor who is willing to serve on the committee to fill the
vacancy. Vacancies on committees may not be filled by significant business
competitors of the debtor,106 nor may they be filled by converting the committee
into a “blended committee” of equity holders and creditors.107
2. Rogue Creditor Committees Reduce the Value of the Estate to Other
Creditors
Rogue committees further threaten creditors by harming the value of the
debtor’s estate, thereby reducing the funds available to co-creditors. While

99

See generally id.
In re Am. W. Airlines, 142 B.R. 901, 902 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1992).
101
Id. at 903.
102
In re Fas Mart Convenience Stores, Inc., 265 B.R. 427, 432 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2001).
103
In re Venturelink Holdings, Inc., 299 B.R. 420, 423 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2003) (“The court adds that the
appearance of a breach of that fiduciary duty should likewise mandate the removal [of a creditor from a
committee]. The bankruptcy process must both be fair and appear fair.”).
104
See, e.g., Brief of Appellant, Nos. C03-1272L, C03-1273L, 2003 WL 23952673 n.9 (W.D. Wash. Sept.
22, 2003) (arguing that the appointment of a committee containing only one legitimate creditor indicated that
the committee should be disbanded).
105
Michelle M. Harner, Committee Capture? An Empirical Analysis of the Role of Creditors’ Committees
in Business Reorganizations, 64 VAND. L. REV. 749, 798 (2011).
106
In re Wilson Foods Corp., 31 B.R. 272, 272 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1983).
107
In re Mercury Fin. Co., 224 B.R. 380, 387 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1998), opinion supplemented on denial of
reconsideration (Aug. 28, 1998), aff’d, 240 B.R. 270 (N.D. Ill. 1999).
100
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committees bear a fiduciary duty to their co-creditors, such a fiduciary duty
becomes meaningless if committee members are few and the replacement of bad
members is impossible. Consequently, if a committee is harming the value of
the estate for its co-creditors, and member replacement is not possible, then the
bankruptcy judge must have the authority to disband the rogue committee.
On the most basic level, excessive committee professional fees reduce the
available return general unsecured creditors can receive in the bankruptcy.108 By
increasing their fees, committee professionals are empowered by § 330 to drain
the available assets of the debtor-in-possession, which naturally causes the
distribution to unsecured creditors to disintegrate.109 This harm to unsecured
creditors is evidenced by the fees incurred in In re Texaco, Inc.,110 in which the
industry committee incurred professional’s fees of roughly $125,000 per month,
thus potentially reducing the assets available for the unsecured creditors by
$7,000,000 over the life of the bankruptcy.111 Another case study in the
destructive potential of committees to unsecured creditors is In re Zale Corp.,112
where five separate committees incurred over $500,000 per week.113 Such
excessive fees drained directly from the debtor company and threatened any
return to unsecured creditors by increasing the likelihood of conversion to
chapter 7.
Moreover, rogue committees can deal serious harm to the debtor’s secured
creditors. This is because, often, committee professionals are paid out of the cash
collateral of a secured creditor.114 In these instances, the longer the committee
operates, and the more fees the committee bills, the more harm is done to secured
creditors. What is more, such use of cash collateral may be ordered by the court
over the specific objection of the secured creditor, whose interest in the estate is
being jeopardized.115 While using cash collateral requires adequate protection of
the secured creditor’s interest, adequate protection is not a guarantee of payment,
which means the use of cash collateral potentially reduces the secured creditor’s

108
Harvey R. Miller, The Changing Face of Chapter 11: A Reemergence of the Bankruptcy Judge as
Producer, Director, and Sometimes Star of the Reorganization Passion Play, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 431, 461
(1995).
109
Id.
110
Id.; In re Texaco Inc., 79 B.R. 560 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987).
111
Miller, supra note 108; 79 B.R. 560.
112
Jewel Recovery, L.P. v. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom (In re Zale Corp.), NO. 392-30001SAF-11, 1996 Bankr. LEXIS 1933 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1996).
113
Miller, supra note 108, at 462; 1996 Bankr. LEXIS 1933.
114
See In re Las Torres Dev., L.L.C., 413 B.R. 687, 699 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009).
115
See In re Proalert, LLC, 314 B.R. 436, 438 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2004).
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security interest.116 Thus, runaway fees incurred by runaway committees not
only harm the interests of the unsecured creditors, but also those creditors who
are ostensibly protected by a security interest.
III. COURTS AND THE COMMITTEES
The split over a bankruptcy judge’s authority to disband a committee did not
emerge overnight. Rather, the legal dispute is the product of an often unclear
Bankruptcy Code and a long history of court uncertainty pertaining to
committees. This Section begins by first describing the pre-BAPCPA circuit
split over a bankruptcy judge’s authority to modify committee membership.
Second, this Section describes how the modern split was foreshadowed in the
old split. Third, this Section details the modern split over a bankruptcy judge’s
ability to disband a committee. The goal of this Section is not to merely describe
the current split in case-law, but instead it is to contextualize the debate as an
evolution of old arguments adapted to fit within the new, post-BAPCPA,
Bankruptcy Code.
A. History of Courts Defining Their Powers to Alter Committees
Historically, courts have had trouble defining their powers to alter, or
otherwise affect, chapter 11 creditor committees. Prior to the passage of the
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (“BAPCPA”) in
2005, there was a circuit split concerning the authority of a bankruptcy judge to
alter the membership of an existing creditor committee. In this split, many
districts held that § 1102 of the Bankruptcy Code did not confer to the court any
authority to review committee decisions made by the U.S. Trustee as it pertains
to committee membership.117 Other districts, however, held that the court did
have the authority to alter the membership of a committee.118
Courts that believed that a bankruptcy judge was able to affect the
membership of a committee did not share a uniform line of the reasoning. Some
116

See In re Elliott Leases Cars, Inc., 20 B.R. 893, 896 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1982).
See In re Wheeler Tech., Inc., 139 B.R. 235, 239 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1992); In re Dow Corning Corp., 212
B.R. 258, 264 (E.D. Mich. 1997); In re Victory Markets, Inc., 196 B.R. 1, 5 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1995); In re
Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., Inc., 118 B.R. 209, 210 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990); Matter of Gates Eng’g Co.,
Inc., 104 B.R. 653, 654 (Bankr. D. Del. 1989); In re Hills Stores Co., 137 B.R. 4, 8 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992).
118
See In re Mercury Fin. Co., 224 B.R. 380, 385 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1998), opinion supplemented on denial
of reconsideration (Aug. 28, 1998), aff’d, 240 B.R. 270 (N.D. Ill. 1999); In re Fas Mart Convenience Stores,
Inc., 265 B.R. 427, 431 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2001); In re Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc., No. 4:96CV396, 1997
WL 155407, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 21, 1997); In re Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., Inc., 200 B.R. 933, 940 (M.D. Fla.
1996).
117
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courts held that Rule 2020 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure gave
judges the inherent authority to affect the membership of a committee.119 Others
believed that the equitable powers conveyed to the court by § 105(a) implied
judicial review of committee membership.120 Still others maintained that the
absence of an express prohibition against judicial review in the legislative
history, in conjunction with § 1102(b)(1), gave bankruptcy judges the authority
to alter committee membership.121 Some courts even went so far as to hold that
this authority grew primarily from a common law presumption of judicial
reviewability.122 While fragmented in their reasoning, these courts were uniform
in their belief that such authority was not only present but obvious and inherent
as a power of the bankruptcy judge.
The reasoning adopted by the courts on the other side of the spilt, which held
that the bankruptcy judge had no power to alter committee membership, was
more uniform. These courts universally believed that the statutory silence of
§ 1102 should be read to mean that Congress never contemplated allowing
bankruptcy judges to alter committee membership.123 Additionally, these courts
reasoned that the repeal of § 1102(c) in 1986 was an express statement by
Congress that bankruptcy judges were barred from altering committee
membership.124 The courts which denied bankruptcy judges the power to affect
committees were nearly unanimous in the reasons why they did so.
However, despite the uniform reasoning of the courts denying jurisdiction,
and the highly fragmented reasoning in support of granting judges such
authority, in 2005 Congress settled the dispute in favor of judicial review.125 In
the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, Congress
expressly provided that:
On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the
court may order the United States trustee to change the membership of
a committee appointed under this subsection, if the court determines
that the change is necessary to ensure adequate representation of

119
See In re Mercury Fin. Co., 224 B.R. at 384, opinion supplemented on denial of reconsideration (Aug.
28, 1998), aff’d, 240 B.R. 270 (N.D. Ill. 1999).
120
See In re Fas Mart Convenience Stores, Inc., 265 B.R. at 431.
121
See In re Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc., No. 4:96CV396, 1997 WL 155407, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Mar.
21, 1997).
122
See In re Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., Inc., 200 B.R. 933, 939 (M.D. Fla. 1996) (“There is a strong
presumption that Congress intends judicial review of administrative action.”).
123
See In re Dow Corning Corp., 212 B.R. at 264.
124
See In re Wheeler Tech., Inc., 139 B.R. 235, 238–39 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1992); see also In re Victory
Markets, Inc., 196 B.R. 1, 5 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1995).
125
See In re ShoreBank Corp., 467 B.R. 156, 160 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2012).
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creditors or equity security holders. The court may order the United
States trustee to increase the number of members of a committee to
include a creditor that is a small business concern.126

The language used by Congress in § 1102(a)(4) was intentionally clear and
expressly addressed the confusion created by the prior circuit split.
B. Foreshadowing the Debate
Prior to the passage of BAPCPA, the split over disbanding a committee was
argued within the context of this old debate about a judge’s power to modify
committees. The cases of In re Dow Corning Corp. and In re New Life
Fellowship are emblematic of the peripheral manner in which the debate was
foreshadowed.
The decision of In re Dow Corning Corp. was issued in 1996.127 The central
issue litigated in Dow Corning was whether the court could issue an order
modifying the composition of various creditor committees involved in the
case.128 Multiple creditors filed motions to the court to modify the composition
of the committee due to fears that they would not be adequately represented
otherwise.129 On this issue, the court determined that it did have the authority to
modify the composition of the committee.130 The court reasoned that, because
the U.S. Trustee had no express power to modify committees, this statutory void
in power had to be filled by the court’s § 105(a) equitable powers.131
However, in dicta, the Dow Corning court went further and determined that,
if necessary, the court could also disband a committee.132 To support this
conclusion, the court argued that FRBP Rule 2007 empowered the court to
disband committees.133 The court argued that, because Rule 2007 permitted the
court to vacate the appointment of a committee if it failed to satisfy
§ 1102(b)(1)’s requirements, the court had the authority to disband that
committee.134 The court reasoned that because (1) the U.S. Trustee was fallible
and could make mistakes in creating a committee, and (2) the Advisory
126

11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(4).
See generally In re Dow Corning Corp., 194 B.R. 121 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1996), rev’d, 212 B.R. 258
(E.D. Mich. 1997).
128
In re Dow Corning Corp., 194 B.R. at 126.
129
Id. at 127–28.
130
Id. at 131.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
Id.
127
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Committee notes on Rule 2007 from the 1991 version of the rule left the door
open for more judicial involvement in committee creation, the court could
disband a committee if it saw fit to do so.135 Although dicta, this portion of the
opinion was a forceful foreshadowing of courts asserting the ability to disband
committees.
Conversely, In re New Life Fellowship foretold the opposite side of the
modern split by suggesting that courts could never have the authority to disband
a creditor committee.136 New Life Fellowship was decided in the Western
District of Oklahoma in 1996 and concerned the issue of whether the court could
vacate the appointment of a bondholder’s committee upon a motion from the
unsecured creditors committee, the case trustee, and the bondholders’ trustee.137
Rather than narrowly tailoring the opinion to the specific facts in dispute, the
court answered the broader question of whether a court could ever disband a
committee.138 Here, the court determined that bankruptcy judges are never
empowered to disband a committee.139 The court supported this conclusion by
reasoning that the text of § 1102 did not provide for the abolition of a committee
under any circumstances.140 The court then attempted to avoid creating a circuit
split by distinguishing the question from the contrary authority of In re Dow
Corning Corp. and other similar cases.141 Consequently, New Life Fellowship
not only foreshadowed the post BAPCPA debate, but also staked an early and
strong position in the discussion.
C. The New Circuit Split: A Judge’s Authority to Disband a Committee
The debate over a bankruptcy judge’s authority over a committee has
evolved since the passage of the BAPCPA in 2005. Instead of being a broad
question of whether a judge can alter the membership of a committee, the dispute
has narrowed to determining whether a judge can eliminate a creditor committee.
In this dispute, there is little case law which directly addresses the question. In
135
This was due to the court’s view that the U.S. Trustee was an administrative agency within the meaning
of the Administrative Agency Procedure Act, and thus subject to court “arbitrary and capricious” review. In re
Dow Corning Corp., 194 B.R. at 131–32 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1996).
136
In re New Life Fellowship, Inc., 202 B.R. 994 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1996).
137
Id. at 995.
138
Id. The case could have been decided merely on the fact that, in lieu of the bondholder’s committee,
the bondholders had no committee representation; despite § 1102(a)(2) permitting the court to order the
appointment of such a committee to “assure adequate representation”. It is clear that the court could have decided
to resolve the case on that narrower basis. The court, however, did not elect to take such a narrow approach. See
11 U.S.C. 1102(a)(2).
139
In re New Life Fellowship, Inc., 202 B.R. at 995.
140
Id.
141
See id. at 996; see also In re Texaco Inc., 79 B.R. 560, 562 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987).
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fact, the universe of cases which are directly on point is populated by only eight
decisions: three of these cases concluding that a bankruptcy judge has the
authority to disband a committee;142 two cases arriving at the opposite
conclusion, holding that the Bankruptcy Code imparts no such authority to
bankruptcy judges;143 and three other cases addressing the issue but, despite
having taken notice of the split, declining to decide the question.144
Consequently, there is no majority rule on the question, which has left the courts
to engage in the unique practice of arguing canons of interpretation and trying
to divine the policy goals of Congress.
1. Post-BAPCPA Case Law
Since the 2005 passage of BAPCP, the courts which hold that judges do have
the authority to disband a committee have each adopted varied, but related,
reasoning which is worth discussing in some detail. The first post-BAPCPA
court to assert the court’s authority to disband a creditor committee was the
Bankruptcy Court of the Western District of North Carolina in In re Pacific
Avenue, LLC.145 The court in Pacific Avenue reasoned that § 105(d) of the
Bankruptcy Code authorizes the judge to disband a creditor committee.146
Quoting the portion of § 105(d)(2) which permits the court to issue an order so
as to “ensure that the case is handled expeditiously and economically . . . ;” the
court maintained that the committee in question was due to be disbanded because
its continued existence was redundant and counterproductive.147 According to
the court, the trustee could protect the interests of the class of creditors to the
same extent that the committee could, rendering the committee redundant.148
Additionally, the court believed that the actions of the creditor’s committee had
actively harmed all parties involved in the litigation, rendering the committee
counterproductive.149 Consequently, the court felt comfortable issuing an order

142
In re City of Detroit, Mich., 519 B.R. 673, 680 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014); In re Pac. Ave., LLC, 467
B.R. 868, 870 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2012); In re Dow Corning Corp., 194 B.R. 121, 131 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1996),
rev’d, 212 B.R. 258 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
143
In re Caesars Entm’t Operating Co., Inc., 526 B.R. 265 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2015); In re New Life
Fellowship, Inc., 202 B.R. 994, 997 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1996).
144
In re JNL Funding Corp., 438 B.R. 356, 361 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Dewey & Leboeuf LLP,
No. 12-12321 MG, 2012 WL 5985325, at *5 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2012); In re Hearthstone Homes, Inc.,
No. BK12-80348-TLS, 2012 WL 4027296, at *3 (Bankr. D. Neb. Sept. 12, 2012).
145
In re Pac. Ave., LLC, 467 B.R. 868 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2012).
146
Id. at 870.
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
Id. (“Although the Committee insists that it is working to promote and protect its unique interests, the
court is not aware of any way in which that has actually occurred.”).
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granting the U.S. Trustee’s motion to disband the unsecured creditors
committee.150
The second post-BAPCPA case to affirm the courts authority to disband a
committee was In re City of Detroit, Mich.,151 and came out of the Bankruptcy
Court of the Eastern District of Michigan. Similar to Pacific Avenue, City of
Detroit read § 105 to confer to the court an authority to disband a creditor
committee.152 However, rather than looking to § 105(d), the City of Detroit court
instead relied on § 105(a).153 The court read § 105(a) to be a grant of broad
equitable powers to the court, insofar as the court’s exercise of discretion was
not inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Code.154 Additionally, in response to the
U.S. Trustee’s claim that the express delegation of the power to modify
committees in § 1102 defined the outer bounds of a judge’s authority, the City
of Detroit court noted that the Code did not expressly prohibit a judge from
disbanding a committee.155 Thus, because the court did not view such authority
to be contradictory to any section of the Bankruptcy Code, the court saw the
power to disband creditor committees to be inherent in the court’s § 105(a)
equitable powers.156
The reasoning of the City of Detroit is diametrically opposed to that of the
court in In re Caesars Entm’t Operating Co., Inc.,157 a case out of the
Bankruptcy Court of the Northern District of Illinois. The court in Caesars
argued that judges lacked sufficient authority to disband a committee due to the
specific language used in § 1102.158 To arrive this conclusion, the court
employed the canon of statutory interpretation expressio unius est exclusio
alterius to say that § 1102(a)’s express delegation of authority to alter committee
membership must be read to exclude any unstated power to disband
committees.159

150
Order Granting Trustee’s Motion to Disband Unsecured Creditors’ Committee, No. 10-32093 Doc. 744
(Filed Jan. 26, 2012). See generally In re Pac. Ave., LLC, 467 B.R. 868 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2012).
151
In re City of Detroit, Mich., 519 B.R. 673.
152
In re City of Detroit, Mich., 519 B.R. at 680. This conclusion was reached after the court initially held
that § 1102 was inapplicable to chapter 9 cases. The discussion concerning § 105 was conducted in the
alternative, assuming that § 1102 was applicable to chapter 9 bankruptcies.
153
Id.
154
In re City of Detroit, Mich., 519 B.R. at 679–80.
155
Id. at 680.
156
Id.
157
In re Caesars Entm’t Operating Co., Inc., 526 B.R. 265 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2015).
158
Id. at 268.
159
Id. at 268–69.

GENSBURGCOMMENTPROOFS_7.11.19

2019]

ROGUE COMMITTEES OR ROGUE JUDGES

7/11/2019 10:13 AM

623

The Caesars court then addressed the § 105 reasoning adopted by Pacific
Avenue and City of Detroit.160 According to the Caesars court, § 105 solely
empowers courts to implement existing Bankruptcy Code provisions.161 This
means that § 105 cannot be used to find equity where the Code does not provide
for it and cannot be the basis creating an “independent source of rights.”162 The
court reasoned that if Congress had intended bankruptcy judges to have the
power to disband committees, then it would have written such an allowance
explicitly into § 1102(a).163 The fact that Congress did not do so was an
indication, to the Caesars court, that such a power was not given to bankruptcy
judges.164
It is much easier to understand the reasoning adopted in Caesars when
viewed in the context of the court’s prior decision In re ShoreBank Corp.165
ShoreBank concerned an emergency motion made by three unsecured creditors
to direct the U.S. Trustee to reconstitute the unsecured creditor’s committee.166
The court denied the creditor’s motion, holding that § 1102(a)(4) does not
authorize the court to review any decision made by the U.S. Trustee.167
Harkening back to the old circuit split concerning a judge’s ability to alter the
membership of a committee, the ShoreBank court noted that when Congress
restored a judge’s ability to alter committee membership in BAPCPA, it did not
define “adequate representation.”168 Because of this, the court placed the heavy
burden of proving a breach of fiduciary duty on the movants.169

160

Id. at 269.
Id.
162
Id.
163
Id. (“Had Congress wanted to give bankruptcy courts the power to abolish committees appointed under
section 1102(a)(1), it could have done so. It chose not to. That choice must be respected.”).
164
Similarly, the court was not convinced by the ad hoc committee’s argument that the second official
committee was no longer necessary to for adequate representation. The ad hoc committee was an unofficial and
uncompensated committee constituting 12.75% of the debtor’s Second Priority Secured Noteholders with notes
coming due in 2018. This ad hoc committee filed a brief joining the debtor’s motion to disbanding the official
committee; arguing that the second official committee ought to be eliminated because the official committee had
become redundant, the official committee could effectively operate in an ad hoc capacity, and because the
intercreditor agreement obviated the need for the official committee. The Court disregarded these arguments in
the course of rejecting the debtor’s original motion. See Joinder of the Ad Hoc Committee of First Lien Bank
Lenders to, and Response in Support of, Debtor’s Motion for Entry of an Order Disbanding the Official
Committee of Second Priority Noteholders, Reconstituting it With the Creditor’s Committee or, Alternatively,
Limiting its Scope, Fees, and Expenses, No. 15-01145 Doc. 463 (Filed Feb. 25, 2015). See generally In re
Caesars Entm’t Operating Co., Inc., 526 B.R. 265.
165
In re ShoreBank Corp., 467 B.R. 156 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2012).
166
Id. at 157.
167
Id. at 161.
168
Id. at 160.
169
Id. at 161.
161
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ShoreBank made the unique argument that the bankruptcy court could not
review the actions of the U.S. Trustee.170 It reasoned that § 1102(a)(4), rather
than permitting a judge to review the decision of the Trustee, required the
bankruptcy judge to make an independent determination of whether committee
membership ought to be altered.171 This was rooted in the principle that court
administrative review of an action would require the court to review the records
of the Trustee, records that the Trustee was not statutorily required to
generate.172 Because the Trustee was not required to produce a record there was
nothing for the court to review, and thus no administrative court review of any
action of the Trustee could take place.173
Thus, ShoreBank served as the foundation for the court’s later decision in
Caesars. The debtor in Caesars argued that the Trustee had inappropriately
permitted the second lien holders to form an official committee.174 Despite the
debtor’s arguments, this was a request to have the court administratively review
a decision of the Trustee. Based on ShoreBank, it was clear that the court in
Caesars would not engage in such a review. Caesars was a natural outgrowth of
ShoreBank’s prior unwillingness treat the U.S. Trustee as a reviewable entity.
Consequently, the court’s unwillingness to “look behind the curtain” to review
the decision-making of the Trustee meant that the court was also unwilling to
disband a committee for its misbehavior in Caesars.
2. Courts That Dodged the Question
While there are two diametrically opposed bodies of case law, the majority
of the post-BAPCPA cases addressing the issue have declined to take a side. The
earliest of the cases to acknowledge the question was In re JNL Funding
Corp.,175 decided in 2010 by the Bankruptcy Court of the Eastern District of
New York. This opinion preceded Pacific Avenue and was thus the first court to
acknowledge the question. JNL Funding concerned a secured creditor who

170

Id.
Id. at 162.
172
Id.
173
Id. (“Because the U.S. Trustee supplies neither a rationale nor a record, there is nothing for a court to
review—other than the bare decision itself, that is—and without a rationale or a record no meaningful review
can take place”).
174
Exhibit C: Notice of Debtors’ Motion for Entry of an Order Disbanding The Official Committee of
Second Priority Noteholders, Reconstituting it With the Creditors’ Committee or, Alternatively, Limiting its
Scope, Fees and Expenses, No. 15-01145 Doc. 384 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. February 19, 2015). See generally In re
Caesars Entm’t Operating Co., Inc., 526 B.R. 265 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2015).
175
In re JNL Funding Corp., 438 B.R. 356 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2010).
171
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claimed that no creditor held an allowable claim against the debtor.176 As such,
the secured creditor filed a motion to have the creditor’s committee disbanded.177
The court denied the motion on the basis that the Trustee had acted reasonably
in appointing the committee.178 In reaching this decision, the court addressed the
question of committee disbandment by merely stating, “[n]otably, however,
Section 1102 is silent as to this Court having power to order a committee to be
disbanded, rather than reconstituted to ensure adequate representation.”179 That
sentence was the extent of the court’s discussion of judicial disbandment of a
committee.
Nonetheless, JNL Funding discussed at length the vitally important question
of the appropriate standard of review of the U.S. Trustee. On this point, the court
maintained that the U.S. Trustee ought to be subject only to an arbitrary and
capricious standard of court review.180 The court reasoned that Congress had
delegated the administrative tasks of bankruptcy to the U.S. Trustee with the
passage of the Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer
Bankruptcy Act of 1986.181 Because of this express delegation, the court held
that Congress had intentionally limited the court’s role in committee
formation.182 As such, a de novo review of U.S. Trustee committee formation
would be inconsistent with its congressionally delegated administrative
responsibilities.183 The U.S. Trustee’s decision with respect to § 1102 committee
appointment could only be set aside if it was demonstrated that the U.S. Trustee
relied on impermissible facts to arrive at that decision.184
The next case to consider the question of committee disbandment, but avoid
the issue, was In re Hearthstone Homes, Inc., which concerned objections to the
unsecured creditor committee’s application for fees.185 According to the
objecting parties, the appointment of a chapter 11 trustee negated the need for
the committee and the committee’s continued existence needlessly created a
financial impediment to confirmation.186 Here, the chapter 11 trustee had made
176
Id. at 359 (“TFC asserts that no Committee Member holds an allowable claim against Debtor, but,
instead, may hold a claim only in the [CEO’s] Individual Case.”).
177
Id. at 359–60.
178
Id. at 360.
179
Id. at 361.
180
In re JNL Funding Corp., 438 B.R. at 360.
181
Id.
182
Id. at 361.
183
Id. at 362.
184
Id. at 363.
185
In re Hearthstone Homes, Inc., No. BK12-80348-TLS, 2012 WL 4027296, at *1 (Bankr. D. Neb. Sept.
12, 2012).
186
Id. at *3.
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a clear effort to have the unsecured creditor committee disbanded.187 Despite
this, the court dodged the issue by merely reducing the committee’s approved
fees from $85,681.50 to $53,048.00.188
Nonetheless, Hearthstone Homes meaningfully discussed the court’s roll in
monitoring committees. It held that bankruptcy courts cannot approve
committee fees if such fees are the result of duplicative work or
disproportionately reduce the chance of the reorganization succeeding.189 As a
result, the Hearthstone Homes decision implied that courts must play an active
role in protecting the estate and the debtor-in-possession from committee
misbehavior.
Two months after Hearthstone Homes, In re Dewey & Leboeuf LLP was
decided in the Bankruptcy Court of the Southern District of New York.190 The
central issue in Dewey was whether the court could disband the Official
Committee of Former Partners.191 The debtor and unsecured creditor committee
moved for disbanding the former partner committee on the belief that the
committee of former partners was counterproductive, too expensive, and no
longer necessary for adequate representation.192 The moving parties argued that
disbandment was an implicit court power that necessarily accompanied its
power to order the appointment of new committees.193 The court dodged this
question by deciding that the committee still served an important purpose.194 It
was clear that the Dewey court was aware of the open question of court authority
to disband, but felt as though it did not need to take a side in the split.

187

Id. at *11.
Id. at *10.
189
Id. at *5–7; see also In re Agriprocessors, Inc., No. 08-02751, 2009 WL 2578950, at *2 (Bankr. N.D.
Iowa Aug. 19, 2009).
190
In re Dewey & Leboeuf LLP, No. 12-12321 MG, 2012 WL 5985325 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2012).
191
Id. at *1.
192
Id.
193
Id. at *2.
194
“Under the circumstances here the Court need not reach the issue whether section 1102 implicitly
confers on the Court the authority to order an official committee appointed by the UST to be disbanded based
on subsequent changed circumstances, or whether sections 105 and 1102 when applied together provide such
authority, because even if the Court has such authority, the Court concludes that the FPC [Former Partner’s
Committee] continues to serve an important purpose, the most obvious function being to prosecute the appeal
the FPC filed from this Court’s decision denying the examiner motion and approving the PCP.” Memorandum
Opinion and Order Denying Debtor’s Application for an Order Directing the United States Trustee to Disband
the Offical Committee of Former Partners, 1:12-bk-12321, In re Dewey & Leboeuf LLP, No. 12-12321 MG,
2012 WL 5985325, at *5 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2012) (Doc. 674).
188
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Yet, Dewey analogized committee disbandment with § 1102(a)(2)’s
empowerment of the court to appoint an additional committee.195 It went on to
say that if the court did have the authority to disband a committee, such a power
could only derive from a showing that the committee in question no longer
adequately represented its constituency.196 Despite the court’s unwillingness to
make such a finding, Dewey warned the former partners committee against
driving the case into administrative insolvency through its fee applications.197
Accordingly, Dewey was aware of the circuit split and proposed a framework
for determining if a committee ought to be disbanded, but did not go so far as to
expressly take a side.198
IV. ANALYSIS
The debate over a judge’s authority to disband a committee has not yielded
a consistent answer as to the legal question, nor has it provided any sort of
guidance to courts moving forward. This Section contains this Comment’s sixpart analysis of the debate over committee disbandment. First, this Section
describes why bankruptcy courts have confused the debate over committee
disbandment. Second, the real-world effects of committees magnifying
administrative claims are articulated. Third, this Section argues that judge’s
must have the “judicial hammer” of committee disbandment. Fourth, analogous
areas of court authority are presented. Fifth, the procedural question of how
disbandment ought to occur is addressed. Sixth, this Section proposes a threestep factor test to guide courts in determining if they ought to disband a
committee.
A. Bankruptcy Courts Have Confused the Debate
While the modern split is an outgrowth of the pre-BAPCPA split, unlike the
prior split, the current circuit dispute appears to conflate two separate questions
of law. These two questions are whether a bankruptcy judge may second guess
the U.S. Trustee in its decision to create the committee and whether a bankruptcy
judge may remedy the misfeasance or malfeasance of an already existent
committee. As it currently stands, all reported cases on the authority of a
bankruptcy judge to disband a committee mistakenly conflate these two
195

Id. at *3.
Id. at *5.
197
Id.
198
Despite this unwillingness to take a side. It seems clear from the language used in the opinion that the
Dewey court thought that it could disband a committee if the need to truly arose. See generally In re Dewey &
Leboeuf LLP, No. 12-12321 MG, 2012 WL 5985325 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2012).
196
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questions and, as a result, these courts have arrived at incomplete legal
conclusions. When viewed in context, Caesars was correct to answer in the
negative to the former inquiry, yet, at the same time, Pacific Avenue and City of
Detroit were correct to answer in the affirmative to the latter.
It is clear that a bankruptcy judge may not substitute his or her own
judgement for that of the Trustee. Courts have routinely held that the judge
should not second guess the discretionary decisions of the Trustee.199 It has been
suggested that this is due to the belief that judicial second guessing would harm
the administration of bankruptcy proceedings by causing the U.S. Trustee to act
in an overly conservative manner.200 As such, courts have generally held that
they will only review the U.S. Trustee’s decisions pertaining to committee
membership on a de novo basis, so as to ensure that the decisions are facially
reasonable. 201
Here, both ShoreBank and Caesars were correct. In ShoreBank, the court
accurately stated that the bankruptcy judge was not entitled to administratively
review the discretionary decisions of the U.S. Trustee.202 To this limited extent,
Caesars appropriately held that § 105(a) did not create a substantive authority
for the court to second guess the U.S. Trustee.203 Similarly, it appropriately held
that § 1102(a) did not license the court to substitute its judgment for the U.S.
Trustee’s with respect to deciding which creditors should serve on the
committee.204
Nonetheless, it is equally clear that the bankruptcy court may employ its
equitable powers to resolve inequities caused by litigating parties.205
Particularly, bankruptcy courts have the authority to police the conduct of
creditors to ensure that the actions of some creditors do not harm the financial
interests of others.206 This is because “[f]ederal courts have inherent equitable
power to sanction a litigant’s malfeasance.”207 In bankruptcy, the source of this
199
Seafarers Pension Plan v. Sturgis, 630 F.2d 218, 221 (4th Cir. 1980) (“We may not second guess the
Trustees’ discretionary judgments.”).
200
In re Melenyzer, 140 B.R. 143, 155 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1992).
201
See In re Value Merchants, Inc., 202 B.R. 280, 287 (E.D. Wis. 1996).
202
See In re ShoreBank Corp., 467 B.R. 156, 162 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2012).
203
In re Caesars Entm’t Operating Co., Inc., 526 B.R. 265, 269 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2015).
204
Id.
205
See Matter of W. T. Grant Co., 4 B.R. 53, 74 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980) (“A fundamental characteristic
of the bankruptcy court is its expansive equitable powers”).
206
See In re Kansas City Journal-Post Co., 144 F.2d 791, 800 (8th Cir. 1944) (citing Prudence Realization
Corp. v. Geist, 316 U.S. 89, 94, 62 S. Ct. 978, 982, 86 L. Ed. 1293 (1942)) (“[S]ubordination is usually said to
be aimed at leveling off, as practicably as possible, the effects of ‘the inequitable conduct of a claimant . . . .’”).
207
In re Phillips Grp., Inc., 382 B.R. 876, 888 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2008).
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inherent equitable power is § 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.208 While the
courts’ § 105(a) equitable powers are broad, they are limited to effectuating
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.209
In this equally narrow respect, both Pacific Avenue and City of Detroit were
decided correctly. Pacific Avenue appropriately employed its equitable powers
to disband a committee which it saw to be counterproductive and thus engaged
in the misfeasance of harming secured creditors by unnecessarily reducing the
cash collateral available to the secured creditor.210 Similarly, City of Detroit
correctly determined that it was empowered to disband a committee which had
committed the misfeasance of refusing to participate in, and actually disavowed,
the mediation process.211 In both of these cases, the courts did not look behind
the reasoning of the U.S. Trustee in appointing the committee, but instead
disbanded the committee as an equitable remedy to the inequity caused by the
misfeasance of that committee.
Nonetheless, in as much as Caesars, Pacific Avenue, and City of Detroit
were decided correctly, each of these opinions also over-applied their reasoning
and arrived at partially incorrect conclusions. Caesars overextended the entirely
accurate prohibition against second guessing the discretion of the U.S. Trustee
to incorrectly claim that the court could never disband a committee.212 Similarly,
Pacific Avenue and City of Detroit overextended their correct inclinations to
remedy inequity in the bankruptcy proceedings by inappropriately “looking
behind the curtain” of the U.S. Trustee’s reasoning for preserving or appointing
the committee in the first place.213 As such, by failing to narrowly frame the
question, all courts may have produced incomplete and partially incorrect
conclusions of law.

208

In re Dairy Mart Convenience Stores, Inc., 351 F.3d 86, 91 (2d Cir. 2003).
In re Middleton Arms, Ltd. P’ship, 934 F.2d 723, 724 (6th Cir. 1991).
210
See Order Granting Trustee’s Motion to Disband Unsecured Creditors’ Committee, No. 10-32093 Doc.
744 at 4 (Filed Jan. 26, 2012).
211
See In re City of Detroit, Mich., 519 B.R. 673, 680 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014).
212
In re Caesars Entm’t Operating Co., Inc., 526 B.R. at 269. When the court held that “Section 105(a)
thus is not a vehicle for reading into section 1102(a)(1) a power to do away with statutory committees when
section 1102(a)(1) itself grants no such power . . . .”, it read the equitable powers of § 105 out of the Bankruptcy
Code. Section 105 may not be a vehicle to read a power into § 1102, but that does not mean it is not a vehicle to
administer equitable remedies when such remedies are necessary to achieve the purposes of the Bankruptcy
Code.
213
See In re Pac. Ave., LLC, 467 B.R. 868, 870 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2012) (“The Trustee is capable of and
required to adequately represent the interests of unsecured creditors in these cases. Consequently, the
Committee’s representation is duplicative and unnecessary.”); In re City of Detroit, Mich., 519 B.R. 673, 681
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014) (“[T]he Court remains wholly unconvinced that the Committee would play the useful
or valuable role contemplated by § 1102.”).
209
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B. The Real Effects of Committee Magnification of Administrative Claims
While the issue of committee disbandment has only arisen in the courts eight
times, the real-world harm of committees unduly forcing conversion to chapter
7 occurs on a more commonplace basis. “[E]ach administrative or priority
creditor may hold the future of the case in its hands. ‘In bankruptcy, everyone’s
fate—the debtors, its employees and its creditors—is often intertwined and
dependent on the success of the plan.’”214 Despite the fact that the legalistic
question of court authority is rarely brought to the court’s attention, committees
can force conversion where such conversion might have otherwise been
unnecessary and might be attributable to committee abuses.
The inability of courts to disband committees can force judges to adopt the
role of fortuneteller. In In re SunEdison, Inc., the court was required to consider
potential committee professional expenses before a committee had been
formed.215 In this frontloaded analysis, the court had to determine whether or not
equity holders in an insolvent company could form an official committee.216 The
court held that the a committee could not be formed because, “[t]he fees and
expenses incurred by the Equity Committee’s professionals, if allowed by the
Court, . . . are administrative claims . . . [and] [p]ayments to [committee]
professionals generally reduce the amount available for distribution.”217 Without
the power to disband the committee at a later date, the SunEdison court and
others are often forced to engage in this type forward thinking analysis.
When a court fails to act as a fortuneteller, committees have room to create
significant inequities. An illustrative case of is In re BH S & B Holdings, LLC.218
At the onset of the bankruptcy, the debtor had $2,704,976 of unrestricted cash
on hand to administer the chapter 11 case.219 However, despite this sizeable cash
reserve, the creditor committee incurred professional fees totaling $2,188,902,
an amount that forced the debtor’s case into administrative insolvency.220 By the
court’s own admission, these committee expenses were excessive in view of the
fact that “the Committee’s efforts have yielded relatively small returns at very

214
In re Molycorp, Inc., 562 B.R. 67, 78 (Bankr. D. Del. 2017) (quoting Douglas G. Baird, Elements of
Bankruptcy 240–41 (6th ed. 2014)).
215
See In re SunEdison, Inc., 556 B.R. 94, 102 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016).
216
See id.
217
Id.
218
See In re BH S & B Holdings, LLC, 439 B.R. 342, 2010 BL 273757 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010).
219
Id.
220
Id.
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substantial expense”221 and that the quality of committee representation “raises
serious questions”222 about the litigation tactics adopted by the committee.
What is more, the debtor in BH S & B attempted to mitigate the damage of
the committee’s excessive fee applications by filing a turnover motion to have
much of the money inappropriately paid out to the committee reclaimed by the
debtor.223 The debtor sought an order declaring that the committee was not
entitled to $1,130,000 in compensation for fees and expenses, disgorging
$379,033 in committee attorney’s fees, and declaring that the committee’s
financial advisors were not entitled to $272,092 in fees.224 Moreover, this motion
was accompanied by an affidavit attesting to the debtor’s potential
administrative solvency if the funds paid to the committee were not returned.225
However, given the nature of the motion, the fact that there were other issues
with the bankruptcy,226 and the expense of litigating the calculation of
appropriate fees in view of prior debtor-creditor fee stipulations, the court
determined that the turnover motion was most appropriately decided postconversion.227 Consequently, despite the debtor’s best efforts, the BH S & B
bankruptcy was forced to convert to chapter 7, and the committee’s incurrence
of objectionable professional fees was a reason for said conversion.
C. The Need For a Judicial Hammer
Justice requires that courts of equity use the lightest touch possible to resolve
inequities;228 however, sometimes the lightest appropriate touch is the full force
of the judicial “hammer.” In the context of committee misbehavior, this
“hammer” is the judicial disbandment of the rogue committee. Because the court
has the clear statutory authority to remove the debtor-in-possession from
governing his or her estate, it is eminently reasonable to assert that a parallel
221

Id.
Id.
223
Debtors’ Emergency Motion For Turnover of Funds Improperly Paid to Committee Professionals and
Related Relief, 1:08-bk-14604, In re BH S & B Holdings, LLC, 439 B.R. 342, 2010 BL 273757 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 2010) (Doc. 869).
224
In re BH S & B Holdings, LLC, 439 B.R. at 350.
225
Declaration of Robert Tetreault in Support of Debtors’ Emergency Motion For Turnover of Funds
Improperly Paid to Committee Professionals and Related Relief, 1:08-bk-14604, In re BH S & B Holdings, LLC,
439 B.R. 342, 2010 BL 273757 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 2010) (Doc. 870).
226
BH S & B’s bankruptcy was plagued by numerous issues which all contributed to the case’s conversion
to chapter 7. One such issue was the debtor’s failure to propose a plan. See generally In re BH S & B Holdings,
LLC, 439 B.R. 342.
227
439 B.R. at 350-51.
228
Devitt v. Potter, 234 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1039 (D.N.D. 2002), aff’d sub nom. Carriere v. Potter, 83 F.
App’x 139 (8th Cir. 2003) (“A court must grant equitable relief sparingly.”).
222
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power exists with respect to creditor committees. Such a “hammer” is a
necessary item in the bankruptcy judge’s toolbox so that the court can fully
police the misconduct of the litigating parties.
For the debtor-in-possession, the “hammer” is the judicial appointment of a
trustee to manage the chapter 11 debtor’s estate.229 Under § 1104(a), the court
may remove a debtor from possession and appoint a chapter 11 trustee if the
court finds that the debtor was engaged in fraud, grossly mismanaged the estate,
or needed to be removed from possession to preserve the interests of creditors.230
In fact, it has been established that the court can appoint a chapter 11 trustee sua
sponte as a product of the court’s § 105 equitable powers.231
A parallel “hammer” must exist to correct the misfeasance or malfeasance
of a committee. This need is bolstered by the fact that the U.S. Trustee is
mandated to remove committee members who may even appear to have
breached their fiduciary duty:
A creditor on a committee who exudes the appearance of a breach of
fiduciary duty undermines that basic bankruptcy tenet, thereby
corrupting the process. The United States Trustee would act arbitrarily
and capriciously if he refused to remove a committee member who
held a conflict of interest amounting to a breach of the fiduciary duty
owed by the creditor to the creditors represented by the committee or
who appeared to hold such a conflict.232

If allowing a creditor who appears to have breached his or her fiduciary duty to
remain on a committee is enough to corrupt the bankruptcy process, then
certainly a committee that has breached its fiduciary duty would similarly
corrupt the bankruptcy process. In such an instance of committee misfeasance
or malfeasance, it would be arbitrary and capricious for the U.S. Trustee to not
disband the committee.233 Yet, without the hammer of judicial disbandment,
such an arbitrary and capricious derogation of the bankruptcy process could
flourish.

229
230
231
232
233

11 U.S.C. § 1104 (a).
11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)–(2).
In re U.S. Mineral Prod. Co., 105 F. App’x 428, 431 (3d Cir. 2004).
In re Venturelink Holdings, Inc., 299 B.R. 420, 423 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2003).
Id.
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D. The “Hammer” of the Court’s Section 105(a) Equitable Powers
Prior to the creation of a committee, membership issues can be resolved by
the U.S. Trustee declining to form the committee.234 Post formation, bankruptcy
judges can only exercise the authority granted to them by the Code to police
litigating parties. Section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a court
may issue all necessary orders to carry out the provisions of title 11:
The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary
or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title. No provision of
this title providing for the raising of an issue by a party in interest shall
be construed to preclude the court from, sua sponte, taking any action
or making any determination necessary or appropriate to enforce or
implement court orders or rules, or to prevent an abuse of process.235

The equitable powers § 105(a) gives the court are, as a result, broad and leave
much to the discretion of the bankruptcy judge.
While the Supreme Court has held that § 105(a) does “not [authorize the
judge] in the name of equity to make wholesale substitution of underlying law,”
it does permit the judge to find equity where the Bankruptcy Code itself already
provides.236 Because the Bankruptcy Code already provides for the adequate
representation of creditors vis-à-vis the formation of committees, courts
logically have § 105(a) equitable powers to preserve the quality of that
representation.237 Since the U.S. Trustee was not expressly granted authority to
disband creditor committees, it is imperative that the court fill this void.238
The Supreme Court has established that every federal court has the inherent
power to sanction or otherwise control abusive litigation practices.239 In a
bankruptcy case, this inherent power is expressed by § 105 of the Bankruptcy
Code. More specifically, § 105(a) empowers the bankruptcy judge to take any
action deemed necessary to prevent abuses of the bankruptcy process, stating
“[o]n the contrary, the broad authority granted to bankruptcy judges to take
any action that is necessary or appropriate ‘to prevent an abuse of process’
described in § 105(a) of the Code . . . .”240Due to this, § 105 has been broadly
234
SALLY S. NEELY, Official Committees in Chapter 11, in ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY: CHAPTER 11
BUSINESS REORGANIZATION 33, 55–56 (2001).
235
11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (emphasis added).
236
Raleigh v. Illinois Dep’t of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15, 24–25 (2000).
237
See generally In re City of Detroit, Mich., 519 B.R. 673, 680 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014).
238
In re Dow Corning Corp., 194 B.R. 121, 131 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1996), rev’d, 212 B.R. 258 (E.D.
Mich. 1997).
239
Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 376 (2007).
240
Id. at 375 (emphasis added).
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understood to be the bankruptcy court’s primary source of statutory authority to
preserve the proper administration of the debtor’s case.241
Additionally, there are similar situations where the bankruptcy courts’ § 105
powers are broadly agreed to extend to police the conduct of parties. It is well
established that § 105 permits the court to force the debtor to turn over all of his
or her property to the trustee.242 Nowhere does the Bankruptcy Code give the
court the power to issue such a turnover order; however, the inherent powers of
the court and § 105 have been widely accepted as the legitimate source of such
authority.243 Section 105 has similarly been accepted as the source of the courts’
authority to issue various procedural orders enforcing the stay.244 Consequently,
the inherent power of the court and § 105 powers are not confined to a narrow
set of circumstances. Such bankruptcy court powers often permeate other related
areas of the common law surrounding court authority and give judges powers
not otherwise expressly delegated in the Bankruptcy Code.
E. Analogous Rule 2007 Exercises of Court Authority
Despite the novelty of the question of committee disbandment, Rule 2007 of
the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure exists as an instructive analogy.
When added to the legal landscape and context of the debate, Rule 2007 makes
clear that the court must have the authority to disband a committee.
Rule 2007 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, entitled “Review
of Appointment of Creditors’ Committee Organized Before Commencement of
the Case,” permits the court to vacate the appointment of a committee in very
limited circumstances.245 In pertinent part, Rule 2007 states:
(a) Motion to review appointment
If a committee appointed by the United States trustee pursuant to
§ 1102(a) of the Code consists of the members of a committee
organized by creditors before the commencement of a chapter 9 or
chapter 11 case, on motion of a party in interest and after a hearing on
notice to the United States trustee and other entities as the court may
direct, the court may determine whether the appointment of the
committee satisfies the requirements of § 1102(b)(1) of the Code.
241
Law v. Siegel, Brief for Bankruptcy Law Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, 2013 WL
4769424 (U.S.), 23 (2013).
242
Id. at 21; see also 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(4).
243
Law v. Siegel, Brief for Bankruptcy Law Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, 2013 WL
4769424 (U.S.), 22 (2013).
244
Id. at 24.
245
See FED. R. BANKR. P. 2007.
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...
(c) Failure to comply with requirements for appointment
After a hearing on notice pursuant to subdivision (a) of this rule, the
court shall direct the United States trustee to vacate the appointment
of the committee and may order other appropriate action if the court
finds that such appointment failed to satisfy the requirements of
§ 1102(b)(1) of the Code.246

By its text, Rule 2007 only applies to situations in which the U.S. Trustee has
given official standing to a pre-existing ad hoc committee, without regard to
§ 1102(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code.247 The case law surrounding Rule 2007 is
thin; however, its use demonstrates a broader power of the court than what Rule
2007 narrowly prescribes.248
At the most basic level, Rule 2007 empowers the bankruptcy court to review
the delegation of official status to an ad hoc committee so as to ensure that
committee membership was fairly decided.249 To decide if it was reasonable for
the U.S. Trustee to give the ad hoc committee official status, Rule 2020 comes
into play, and the court may then review the decision of the U.S. Trustee in
forming the committee as a contested matter.250 This matter is decided in the
narrow context of the ad hoc committee’s ability to satisfy Bankruptcy Code
§ 1102(b)(1).251 If it is determined that the committee was improperly given
official status, the court may then alter the committee’s membership to remediate
the inequity.252
Despite the narrow intention and actual application of Rule 2007, a handful
of courts have read the delegation of power in Rule 2007 to signal the broad
nature of court review.253 Significantly, this broad interpretation finds support in
the Advisory Committee notes to Rule 2020.254 Those advisory notes state,
246

FED. R. BANKR. P. 2007(a), (c).
See In re Bayou Grp., LLC, 431 B.R. 549, 555 n.4 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010); see also In re A.H. Robins
Co., 65 B.R. 160, 165 (E.D. Va. 1986), aff’d sub nom. Van Arsdale v. Clemo, 825 F.2d 794 (4th Cir. 1987).
248
A quick search of Westlaw citations to Rule 2007 reveal only fourteen cases. Furthermore, only six of
these fourteen cases actually refer to Rule 2007 (rather than Rule 2007.1 or Rule 2007.2) and deal with the
appointment of a committee.
249
In re A.H. Robins Co., 65 B.R. 160, 165 (E.D. Va. 1986), aff’d sub nom. Van Arsdale v. Clemo, 825
F.2d 794 (4th Cir. 1987).
250
In re Victory Markets, Inc., 196 B.R. 1, 5 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1995); see also FED. R. BANKR. P. 2020,
9014.
251
In re Bayou Grp., LLC, 431 B.R. at 555 n.4.
252
In re Dow Corning Corp., 194 B.R. 121, 132 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1996), rev’d, 212 B.R. 258 (E.D.
Mich. 1997).
253
See generally In re Pierce, 237 B.R. 748, 753 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1999); In re Dow Corning Corp., 194
B.R. at 131; In re Victory Markets, Inc., 196 B.R. at 5.
254
194 B.R. at 131.
247
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“[a]lthough this rule deals only with judicial review of the appointment of
prepetition committees, it does not preclude judicial review under Rule 2020
regarding the appointment of other committees.”255 From this language it can be
easily extrapolated that the bankruptcy court has the authority to act with respect
to committees when the U.S. Trustee is either unwilling or unable to do so.256
Additionally, Rule 2007 demonstrates that the U.S. Trustee does not have
unfettered discretion with respect to committees and that committees are not
immune from judicial supervision.257 Logically, if the court is to review
committee action, the source of this supervisory power must come from § 105
of the Bankruptcy Code.258 This is because § 105 conveys equitable powers to
the bankruptcy judge, and Rule 2007 is only applicable if there is an issue of
inequity or unfairness.259 Such logic is easily analogous to that of disbanding
rogue committees, whose continued existence may generate inequity within the
case’s proceedings.
Importantly, however, this analogous nature of Rule 2007 did not escape the
court’s attention in Caesar’s.260 In Footnote 2, the court accurately noted the
narrow applicability of Rule 2007 and observed that no such ad-hoc-turnedofficial committee existed in that case.261 In so observing, the court was correct.
Rule 2007 certainly does not prescribe a general power to disband committees
to judges, and it does not allow judges to second guess or look behind the
reasoning of the U.S. Trustee.262 However, this does not defeat the logic of Rule
2007, nor does it lessen the broad and permissive language used in Rule 2007’s
Advisory Committee Notes. Furthermore, Rule 2007 does expressly authorize
the court to “vacate the appointment of the committee.”263 The word “vacate”
means “to nullify,” to “invalidate,” or, in other words, to “disband.”264 Yet, the
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure cannot override the substantive
255

Id. at 132 (quoting Advisory Committee Note to Rule 2007 (1991)).
In re Pierce, 237 B.R. at 753.
257
Id.
258
Id.
259
Id. at 754.
260
In re Caesars Entm’t Operating Co., Inc., 526 B.R. 265, 268 n.2 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2015).
261
Id.
262
It is important to note what the court is doing when it is reviewing a Rule 2007 motion. When the court
is reviewing a Rule 2007 motion it is deciding if the moving party has made a sufficient showing to demonstrate
unfairness and U.S. Trustee indifference. It is emphatically not an administrative review of the non-existent
record of the U.S. Trustee’s decision-making process in forming the committee. Similar types of judicial reviews
are conducted to determine the trustee’s bad faith, or lack thereof, and do not constitute peaking behind the
curtain. See c.f. In re Dow Corning Corp., 194 B.R. at 132.
263
FED. R. BANKR. P. 2007(c).
264
Vacate, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
256
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provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, and any conflict between the Code and the
Rules must be settled in favor of the Code.265 As such, if the Bankruptcy Code
completely precluded disbandment of a committee, then Rule 2007 could not
allow the vacation of its appointment. Consequentially, committee disbandment
is, on its face, consistent with the Bankruptcy Code.
F. The Procedural Question
Nonetheless, even with the knowledge that the Bankruptcy Court must have
the authority to disband a committee, there is the accompanying procedural
question of how such a disbandment ought to occur. Within the cases in which
courts have disbanded creditor committees, there is some inconsistency as to
how the judge decided to procedurally do so. Some courts did so by directing
the Trustee to dissolve the committee.266 Other courts circumvented the Trustee
and disbanded the committee via the court’s order.267 The most reasonable and
proper procedure is for the bankruptcy court to direct the U.S. Trustee to dissolve
the committee.
The procedural question may be answered by looking to analogous court
orders pertaining to § 1102(a)(4). Section 1102(a)(4) mandates that the court
order the U.S. Trustee to alter the membership of a committee when such change
is necessary for the adequate representation of creditors:
On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the
court may order the United States trustee to change the membership of
a committee appointed under this subsection, if the court determines
that the change is necessary to ensure adequate representation of
creditors or equity security holders.268

When a court alters the membership of a committee, the appropriate means of
doing so is via an order to the Trustee. Because of this, it follows that the
disbandment of a committee ought to occur via an order directing the Trustee to
eliminate the committee.

265

In re Barnes, 308 B.R. 77, 81 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2004).
Order Directing United States Trustee to Disband Official Committee of Equity Security Holders, No.
05-44481 (RDD) Doc. 16576 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. April 23, 2009).
267
Order Granting Trustee’s Motion to Disband Unsecured Creditors’ Committee, No. 10-32093 Doc. 744
(Filed Jan. 26, 2012) (“The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors is hereby disbanded and shall have no
further standing in connection with these cases, effective upon the entry of this order.”).
268
11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(4).
266
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G. The New Factor Test
If a bankruptcy court receives a motion to disband a creditor committee, it
should employ a three-factor analysis to determine if disbandment is justified.
“Abuse of Discretion” standards are undesirable because they offer no actual
guidance to the lower courts who seek precedential authority to guide their
decision-making.269 Instead, factor tests give lower courts guidance and promote
horizontal uniformity among the circuits, thus creating an air of predictability
and reducing forum shopping.270 When a court receives a motion to disband a
committee, the court should conduct three inquiries: (1) did the committee
engage in malfeasance or misfeasance, (2) would a “lighter touch” fix the
problem, and (3) is the committee necessary for adequate representation.
1. Did the Committee Engage in Malfeasance or Misfeasance?
First, the court should determine whether the committee has acted in a way
that unjustifiably harms the debtor-in-possession or co-creditor’s interests. This
may be determined by measuring the average monthly professional fees
requested by the committee, by determining if the committee is acting in a purely
self-interested manner, or by determining if the committee has acted in bad faith.
If the court determines that such misfeasance or malfeasance has occurred, then
the court should use its § 105 equitable powers to remediate the inequity.
This first step is similar to what courts already do in considering whether to
appoint a chapter 11 trustee. When considering whether the court ought to
remove the debtor-in-possession, the court determines whether the appointment
of a chapter 11 trustee is in “the interests of creditors, any equity security
holders, and other interests of the estate.”271 In practice, this analysis means that
the court must look to see if the debtor-in-possession has engaged in any type of
misfeasance or malfeasance.272 In the case of the appointment of a chapter 11
trustee, the court assumes that removal is “the exception, rather than the rule.”273
Similarly, determining if the committee has engaged in any significant
misfeasance or malfeasance will allow disbandment to remain an exceptional
remedy.
269
Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV.
635, 659 (1971).
270
Shannon M. Raley, Tweaking Tinker: Redefining an Outdated Standard for the Internet Era, 59 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 773, 798 (2011) (“Factor tests ensure that courts . . . are not left to decipher the meaning of
ambiguous words on their own and thus reach contradictory conclusions.”).
271
In re Eurospark Indus., Inc., 424 B.R. 621, 627 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting 11 U.S.C. 1104(a)(2)).
272
See generally In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 113 B.R. 164, 169 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990).
273
In re Sharon Steel Corp., 871 F.2d 1217, 1225 (3d Cir. 1989).
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Properly evaluating the harm caused to co-creditors was also paramount in
the old circuit split concerning a judge’s authority to remove an individual
committee member from the committee.274 In this analysis, courts were forced
to determine whether a creditor had acted in such a way as to have violated their
fiduciary duty to their co-creditors.275 Courts determine whether there was a
conflict of interest and other misbehavior which could potentially jeopardize the
creditor’s ability to effectively serve on the committee.276 Removal of a creditor
was the exception and acted as a vanguard against judicial overreach.
Consequently, a similar first step—identifying unjustified committee-caused
harm to the debtor-in-possession or co-creditors—will make sure that committee
disbandment remains an extreme remedy.
2. Does a Lighter Touch Work?
Second, the court must decide if a remedy exists which allows the court to
preserve the committee while resolving the inequity. If denying the requested
fees of the committee’s professionals or reconstituting the committee with other
creditors is sufficient, then the judge should stop his or her analysis and go with
the lighter touch. If it does not, then the court has the § 105 equitable power to
disband the committee.
Such a cautious approach to courts employing the remedy of judicial
committee disbandment is mirrored in other areas of the law. One example is the
use of judicial estoppel in bankruptcy cases. Here courts have held that “judicial
estoppel is a powerful weapon to employ against a party seeking to vindicate its
rights, and there are often lesser weapons that can keep alleged inconsistent
statements in check . . . .”277 Because often a lighter touch will suffice, courts
are to exhaust lesser remedies—such as allowing a party to impeach the debtor
in court—before they resort to judicial estoppel.278 Similarly, courts often look
to lesser remedies when considering whether to remove the debtor-in-possession
from a bankruptcy with the appointment of a chapter 11 trustee.279

274

In re First RepublicBank Corp., 95 B.R. 58, 61 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988).
Id.
276
Id.
277
Vehicle Mkt. Research, Inc. v. Mitchell Int’l, Inc., 767 F.3d 987, 993 (10th Cir. 2014).
278
Id.
279
See In re Esco Elevators, Inc., No. 494-44339-MT-11, 1995 WL 605982, at *5 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Jan.
31, 1995) (“The Court has considered whether lesser remedies would suffice, and in the context of this Case
they would not.”).
275
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Similarly, Rule 41(b)280 dismissals with prejudice require the court to
determine that “(1) a party [has] engage[d] in a clear pattern of delay or willful
contempt (contumacious conduct); and (2) the district court specifically finds
that lesser sanctions would not suffice.”281 This exhaustion of lesser remedies is
built into the trial court’s analysis for every Rule 41(b) dismissal, and the failure
to consider lesser remedies has even been held to be an abuse of the trial judge’s
discretion.282
For all of these remedies—including committee disbandment—it is difficult,
if not impossible, to “unscramble the egg” and undo court action. Because of
this, it is necessary to bake-in a requirement that the bankruptcy judge has
considered all lighter touches prior to disbandment. Moreover, such a
requirement forces the bankruptcy court to fire “warning shot” lesser remedies,
and restrains the court’s discretion in disbanding a committee. As such, due to
the serious nature of committee disbandment, bankruptcy courts must be careful
to exhaust lesser remedies before deciding to disband a committee.
3. Is That Committee Necessary for Adequate Representation?
Finally, the court needs to determine if the committee is necessary for the
adequate representation of the class of creditors. If the court determines that the
committee is not adequately representing the class of creditors, or if an ad hoc
committee would provide functionally equivalent services to what the official
committee rendered, then the committee may be redundant. This step of the
analysis is vitally important, because the court’s § 105 equitable powers cannot
be used to contradict express provision in the Bankruptcy Code. Because § 1102
provides for the “adequate representation” of creditors via the creation of a
committee, if a committee is necessary to “adequately represent” a class of
creditors then the judge may not ever disband the committee.283 As such, this
analysis requires the court to determine if the committee in question has
overlapping responsibilities with another official or ad hoc committee. If

280

FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
Kammona v. Onteco Corp., 587 F. App’x 575, 582 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Betty K Agencies, Ltd.
v. M/V Monada, 432 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2005)) (emphasis added).
282
Kammona, 587 F. App’x at 583.
283
It is not difficult, however, to imagine a situation in which a committee is contingently disbanded
insofar as another committee can be created to represent the creditors at the time of the disbandment of the
misbehaving committee. Hypothetically, such an order disbanding a committee would, within the same order,
create another committee (pulling its members from a broader pool of creditors to avoid the replacement
problem) to immediately step into the shoes of the disbanded committee. The creation of such a new committee
is no longer controversial and is expressly provided for under 11 U.S.C. § 1102 (a)(2).
281
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substantially all of the committee’s responsibilities are duplicative, then the
committee may be considered redundant.
Relatedly, the Bankruptcy Code specifically requires the bankruptcy court
to consider the adequate representation of creditors when modifying a
committee.284 Judicial modification of a committee is generally viewed as an
“extraordinary remedy” that courts should grant with reluctance.285 This
requirement has been translated into a burden placed on the moving party to
show that the adequate representation of creditors will not be harmed by the
court’s actions with respect to the committee.286
The Bankruptcy Code does not provide a framework for determining what
“adequate representation” of creditors means.287 Nonetheless, courts have
created an independent seven-step test to aid in determining adequate
representation when considering whether to order the creation of an additional
committee:
(1) the ability of the existing committee to function;
(2) the nature of the case;
(3) the standing and desires of the various constituencies;
(4) the ability of creditors to participate in a case without an additional
committee;
(5) the delay and additional cost that would result if the court grants
the motion;
(6) the tasks which a separate committee is to perform; and
(7) other factors relevant to the adequate representation issue.288

This seven-step adequate representation sub-test is easy to incorporate into the
broader calculus of whether a committee ought to be judicially disbanded.
Because courts are already familiar with looking to the creditors’ adequate
representation prior to modifying—or ordering the creation of new—
committees, it would not be difficult for the bankruptcy judge to engage in a
similar seven-step analysis before deciding to disband a committee.
Consequently, because the Bankruptcy Code requires the adequate

284
285
286
287
288

Id. § 1102(a)(2), (4).
In re Residential Capital, LLC, 480 B.R. 550, 557 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012).
Id. at 558.
Id.
Id. (citing In re Dana Corp., 344 B.R. 35, 38 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006)).
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representation of creditors, and because bankruptcy judges are already familiar
with looking to the adequacy of creditors’ representation, judges must safeguard
adequate representation of creditors before a decision can be made to disband a
committee.
A judge may fairly disband a committee if he or she conducts all three
inquiries, but not if only one of these factors is analyzed by the court. Requiring
the court to look at all three factors will ensure adequate representation because
it will create an inherent bias towards preserving the committee. Thus, a
redundant committee may not be disbanded if the inequity may be resolved by
a lighter touch. Nor may a committee whose misfeasance or malfeasance cannot
be resolved by a lighter touch be disbanded if the services it renders are not
duplicative. This baked-in presumption of committee preservation will ensure
no violence is done to § 1102, and at the same time will give bankruptcy judges
an avenue to exercise their § 105(a) equitable powers. Additionally, on appeal,
non-specialty district judges will be able to more easily and uniformly review
committee disbandment orders, thus avoiding the messy inquiry into the
discretion of the bankruptcy judge. Consequently, a three-factor test should be
adopted to determine if a committee ought to be disbanded.
CONCLUSION
Bankruptcy judges must have the authority to disband creditor committees.
While the case law concerning a judge’s authority to strike a committee is split
and sparsely populated, a broader understanding of § 105 and analogous areas
of court authority make clear that a bankruptcy judge has the equitable authority
to disband a committee for that committee’s misfeasance or malfeasance. We
know this because of the history of committee formation, because of the prior
circuit split, and because of the case law on the modern split.
Although the question of disbandment seems simple on its face, no existing
court opinion has addressed the issue with complete accuracy. This is because
courts have inappropriately combined two distinct legal questions. These legal
questions are whether a bankruptcy judge can second guess the discretion of the
U.S. Trustee and whether a bankruptcy judge can disband a committee to remedy
the committee’s misfeasance or malfeasance. From this Comment’s analysis, it
is clear that § 105 empowers the court to do only the latter and not the former.
A clear understanding of what question is being asked allows us to analogize
the more precise issue to similar areas of the law. Doing so reveals that
bankruptcy judges already have the authority to alter the rights of parties to a
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bankruptcy if failing to do so would result in some sort of inequity. The
wellspring for this and many similar equitable court powers is § 105 of the
Bankruptcy Code. Reading § 105 to delegate the authority to disband a
misbehaving committee to a bankruptcy judge makes the most sense of Supreme
Court precedent and avoids throwing into question other similar, but more
broadly accepted, exercises of court power.
Finally, a clear answer to a clarified question is not particularly useful to the
courts unless there is some framework surrounding the use of that authority. As
such, this Comment proposes a three-factor test to permit bankruptcy judges and
reviewing courts to determine if a bankruptcy judge has overstepped his or her
§ 105 equitable authority. In view of this, this Comment has answered the
procedural question and determined that the court must disband via issuing a
directive to do so to the U.S. Trustee.
Ultimately, a bankruptcy court is a court of equity. As such, when a court
disbands a misbehaving committee, it is the committee that has gone rogue and
not the judge.
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